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CONFLICT ON THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: 
JUDICIAL CONFUSION AND RACE-CONSCIOUS 
SCHOOL ASSIGNMENTS 
Philip T. K. Daniel* and Mark A. Gooden** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court addressed the question 
of race-conscious decision making in student assignment plans 
in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School 
District No. 1 (PICS). 1 Immediately following the court's 
decision, many questioned whether policymaking could ever 
focus on such plans in K-12 education. As the courts and other 
legal authorities have subsequently interpreted the case, it 
seems evident that educational diversity may be a compelling 
governmental interest that justifies the implementation of 
policies designed to provide some level of racial balance in K-12 
education. What constitutes a plan that is narrowly tailored to 
meet this interest-and thus what constitutes a 
constitutionally permissible plan-is the subject of judicial 
confusion. 
* William and Marie Flesher Professor of Educational Administration. Adjunct 
Professor of Law, The Ohio State University. 
** Associate Professor. University of Texas at Austin. Director of The Principalship 
Program. 
1. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Dist. No. 1 551 U.S. 701 (2007) 
[hereinafter PICS]. 
School districts in Seattle, Washington and Jefferson County, Kentucky 
voluntarily adopted race-conscious student assignment plans as both a remedial 
measure to address de facto segregation and, coextensively, to achieve the 
educational goal of a diverse student body that would be reflective of the racial 
make-up of the entire district community. The objective of the activity, according 
to school officials, was to promote the pedagogical and social benefits flowing from 
diversity in an increasingly pluralistic society and global marketplace. 
Phillip T.K. Daniel, Not So Much a Counterpoint as a Call for Change: The Decision of 
Parents Involved for Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 and its Impact 
on America's Schools, 231 EDUC. L. REP. 511, 512 (2008). 
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The opinion authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, joined 
by three other justices, holds that diversity absent de jure2 
segregation was not a compelling interest for K-12 education.3 
Justice Stephen Breyer's dissenting opinion, joined by another 
three justices, holds in contrast that diversity in education is 
often a compelling interest absent de jure segregation.4 
Between these two divergent opinions rests Justice Anthony 
Kennedy's concurrence; functionally, his concurrence serves as 
the court's decision since it is needed to place Roberts' opinion 
in the majority. 
This Article discusses PICS opinions at length, paying 
particular attention to Chief Justice Roberts' plurality and 
Justice Kennedy's concurrence. The analysis includes potential 
criticism of the plurality opinion and addresses unclear or 
inconsistent positions. Careful analysis shows that PICS leaves 
much open for interpretation and potential ambiguity. The 
following section analyzes four subsequent lower court opinions 
attempting to interpret and apply PICS. Comparison of these 
opinions and the widely divergent approaches of the four lower 
courts employ evidences judicial confusion and inconsistent 
application. The examination of these cases demonstrates the 
apparent lack of universally applicable standards for courts to 
apply in future cases. 
For both educators and the attorneys who represent them, 
the crucial question remains as to what the PICS decision 
means for the future of race-conscious school assignments. 
II. FOUR ON THE RIGHT, FOUR ON THE LEFT, AND KENNEDY IN 
BETWEEN 
The first thing likely to strike any reader of the PICS 
decision is that it requires some effort to determine which of 
the opinions actually controls. 5 A close reading reveals that 
2. Daniel, supra note 1, at 8. 
De jure racial discrimination, as defined by the courts in desegregation cases, 
occurs in public education when the state or its representative agencies classify 
and segregate students according to race and thereby create dual school systems 
or racially identifiable schools within a school district. In contrast, de facto 
segregation in the public schools refers to a racial imbalance caused by decision 
making of private individuals involving social or economic factors such as housing 
patterns, rather than any official action. 
3. See PICS, 551 U.S. at 720. 
4. Id. at 842 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
5. The PICS case contains in fact five separate opinions, this Article analyzes at 
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only the portions of the Roberts opinion in which Justice 
Kennedy concurs are controlling law, as they are the only 
portions of any of the opinions that garnered the votes of a 
majority of the Court. It is important, to note, however, that 
the Breyer dissent received four votes, and that on certain 
issues, Justice Kennedy's swing vote is more closely aligned 
with the dissent than the majority. The resulting decision in 
this case is at once both intricate and entropic. 
This section analyzes and offers a critique of the Roberts 
plurality, the Breyer dissent, and the Kennedy concurrence. 
This treatment will orient the reader as to each opinion's 
approach to the law, some shortcomings and strengths of each 
position, and difficulties that emerge in trying to glean a 
workable standard from the case. 
A. Chief Justice Roberts 
Chief Justice Roberts's opinion clarifies, first and foremost, 
that any government action in which the state "distributes 
burdens or benefits on the basis of individual racial 
classifications . . . is reviewed under strict scrutiny."6 
Consequently, a school district's use of racial classification 
must be "'narrowly tailored' to achieve a 'compelling 
governmental interest."'7 According to the Roberts opinion, to 
date, there are only two compelling governmental interests 
that the Supreme Court has identified for which an educational 
institution may use racial classifications: remedying racial 
discrimination created by law (de jure segregation), and 
student body diversity, broadly defined, in the context of higher 
education.8 
Chief Justice Roberts wrote that neither of these contexts 
was applicable in PICS. 9 Regarding the first compelling 
governmental interest of remedying de jure segregation created 
by law, he observed that the Seattle School District was not 
subject to a court desegregation order at that time. For this 
reason, Roberts explained that it was difficult to argue that the 
district's efforts at racially influenced assignment decisions 
length three of them. For additional information, see PICS 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
6. Id. at 720. 
7. !d. (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)). 
8. !d. at 720-22. 
9. Id. at 720-21. 
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were required in order to comply with a court order to 
remediate de jure segregation. 10 Although the Louisville School 
District was at one time subject to a desegregation order, upon 
compliance with that order, the court closed the proceedings 
and certified the district as unitary. 11 As a result, Louisville 
school officials were likewise unable to claim that they were 
remedying de jure segregation. 12 
Further, the Roberts opinion summarily distinguished 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 13 a case permitting the use of race in 
collegiate admissions decisions. The Chief Justice factually 
distinguished between K-12 attendance and a college 
education, claiming that the "diversity interest at stake in 
[Grutter] ... flowed from the unique First Amendment issues 
inhering in the context of high education: [specifically] 
expansive notions of freedom of thought and speech associated 
with 'institutional' academic freedom." 14 
With these two precedents identified and distinguished 
from the case at bar, Chief Justice Roberts sought resolution of 
the next two questions: first, is there another educational goal 
like remedying de jure segregation or student diversity in 
higher education that is a compelling governmental interest, 
and if so, are the actions by the school districts in PICS 
narrowly tailored to achieve this goal? 
Chief Justice Roberts first addressed the underlying goals 
of the districts' plans. Since the plans were not individualized 
in their application, considered only two racial categories 
(white and non-white), and identified the number of students 
assigned on the basis of race only after the fact, he found that 
true goal of the student assignment plans was "directed only to 
racial balance, pure and simple." 15 As racial balancing was "an 
objective this Court has repeatedly condemned as illegitimate," 
it could not be a compelling governmental interest. 16 In 
explaining this positiOn, the Chief Justice argued that 
accepting racial balancing without demanding a greater 
10. Id. at 712. 
11. ld. at 720-21. 
12. Id. 
13. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
14. Daniel, supra note 1, at 515 (citing John LaNear, The Misreading of Sweezy; 
How Justice Powell Mistakenly Created Institutional Academic Freedom, 201 EDUC. L. 
REP. 501 (2006)). 
15. PICS, 551 U.S. at 726. 
16. ld. 
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objective, such as remedying intentional discrimination or 
student diversity in higher education, means that race 
consciousness could always be a compelling governmental 
interest regardless of context. This is because "[a]llowing racial 
balancing as a compelling end in itself would 'effectively 
assur[e] that race will always be relevant in American life, and 
that the "ultimate goal" of "eliminating entirely from 
governmental decision-making such irrelevant factors as a 
human being's race" will never be achieved."' 17 Interestingly, 
Chief Justice Roberts did not purport that the goals behind the 
disputed plans in PICS were unjustifiable in all contexts. 18 The 
opinion pointed out that neither district framed the plans as 
pure racial balancing. 19 Indeed, the goals identified included 
the encouragement of racial diversity and the prevention of 
racial isolation.2° Chief Justice Roberts did not find that these 
particular goals were insufficiently compelling, but rather that 
the plans at issue failed to actually address these goals.21 To 
support this position, the opinion pointed to persuasive 
evidence on the record that the districts were unsure as to 
what precisely constituted racial diversity or racial isolation.22 
Finally, the Chief Justice discussed the question of narrow 
tailoring. "Narrow tailoring requires 'serious, good faith 
consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives."'23 The 
Louisville district provided no evidence of district consideration 
of alternative options.24 The Seattle district did consider 
alternative options, but Chief Justice Roberts' assessment that 
the alternatives "were rejected with little or no consideration" 
seems an implicit finding of a failure to consider them in good 
faith. 25 
With a view toward both school districts, the Roberts 
opmwn appears to suggest that the only compelling 
governmental interest justifying a student assignment plan 
17. !d. at 730 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co .• 488 U.S. 469, 495 
(1989) (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 4 76 U.S. 267, 320 (1986) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting))). 
18. !d. at 747-48. 
19. !d. at 725-26. 
20. !d. at 715. 
21. !d. at 732. 
22. !d. at 731. 
23. !d. at 735 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003)). 
24. !d. 
25. !d. 
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that takes race into account is one designed to remedy de jure 
segregation.26 Additionally, even in the face of a compelling 
governmental interest, Chief Justice Roberts also required 
satisfaction of the narrow tailoring test; a student assignment 
plan must use racial classifications only as "a last resort."27 
B. Criticism of the Roberts Opinion 
This section offers a critique of Chief Justice Roberts' 
opinion in PICS on the basis of its seeming adherence to an 
ambiguous position of a color-blind constitution advocated in 
dissent by Justice Harlan in Plessy v. Ferguson. The analysis 
shows that subsequent Supreme Court treatment of the color-
blind constitution position leaves dubious evidence of its actual 
precedential value and shows significant debate among the 
Justices as to its meaning. Chief Justice Roberts' reliance on 
this concept is therefore somewhat suspect and casts doubt 
upon the validity of his opinion. 
As Justices Breyer and John Paul Stevens noted in their 
dissents,28 Chief Justice Roberts's opinion seemed, in some 
respects, to ignore significant constitutional precedent by the 
Supreme Court holding that the Constitution does not require 
color-blind treatment under the law. The Chief Justice instead 
appeared to advocate a position much older than Brown v. 
Board of Education,29 namely the view expressed by Justice 
John Harlan in his famous dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson: 
Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor 
tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all 
citizens are equal before the law. The humblest is the peer of 
the most powerful. The law regards man as man, and takes 
no account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil 
rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are 
involved. It is, therefore, to be regretted that this high 
tribunal, the final expositor of the fundamental law of the 
land, has reached the conclusion that it is competent for a 
26. Id. at 749 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
27. ld. at 735 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 519 
(1989)). 
28. For Justice Stevens's opinion, see id. at 797-803; for Justice Breyer's opinion, 
see id. at 803-68. 
29. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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State to regulate the enjoyment by citizens of their civil rights 
solely upon the basis ofrace.30 
87 
The most obvious problem with this position is that Justice 
Harlan wrote in dissent, so his words did not reflect the 
Supreme Court's position at the time he wrote them. 31 In order 
for the color-blind constitution to have precedential value, some 
subsequent decision or decisions must have adopted it; this 
proves problematic in trying to justify Chief Justice Roberts' 
adherence to Harlan's position. The Supreme Court overturned 
Plessy v. Ferguson in 1954 in Brown v. Board of Education. 32 In 
this subsequent case, the Supreme Court noted that prior to 
Plessy, the Supreme Court had interpreted the Fourteenth 
Amendment to prohibit "all state-imposed discriminations 
against the Negro race"-a concept distinguishable from Chief 
Justice Robert's articulation of the color-blind constitution as 
prohibiting discrimination against any racial group. 33 In order 
to follow precedent, the Plessy decision did not per se allow 
racial discrimination, but rather found that segregated services 
such as transportation and education, despite treating races 
differently, were separate but still equal and thus not 
discriminatory.34 When the Court issued its decision in Brown 
v. Board of Education, it followed the Plessy decision insofar as 
it rejected outright racial discrimination, but went further in 
holding that segregation was itself discriminatory and 
therefore impermissible. 35 
While simplified, this timeline it is critically important for 
evidencing ambiguity and, perhaps, disingenuousness on the 
part of Chief Justice Roberts. The foregoing shows that when 
the Supreme Court overturned Plessy, it declined to adopt the 
color-blind constitution conceptualized by Justice Harlan. In 
fact, in the years following Brown v. Board of Education, it 
became quite apparent that the Supreme Court, even if it chose 
30. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
31. It has been argued that Justice Harlan intended for his words to be applied 
only to African·Americans and not to other groups. See Gabriel J. Chin, The First 
Justice Harlan by the Numbers: Just How Great was ''The Great Dissenter?", 32 AKRON 
L. REV. 629 (1999). 
32. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. at 494·95. 
33. Id. at 490·91. 
34. ld. at 490. 
35. ld. at 493. 
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to adopt the color-blind constitution idea, the Court was not 
entirely certain what this concept meant. 36 
One articulation of the color-blind constitution is found in 
Justice Potter Stewart's dissenting opinion in Fullilove v. 
Klutznick, joined by Justice William Rehnquist. 37 Justice 
Stewart argued that the color-blind constitution not only 
prohibited governmental action designed to exclude citizens on 
the basis of race, but that it also prohibited governmental 
action designed to grant preferential treatment to citizens of 
certain races.38 
An alternative formulation of the color-blind constitution is 
found in Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Johnson v. 
California, in which she argued that the color-blind 
constitution did not prohibit race-based governmental action, 
but only required strict scrutiny of any such action.39 
A third iteration of the color-blind constitution--found in 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke more or less 
rejects the concept. In partial dissent, Justice Brennan (with 
Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun) argued that Justice 
Harlan's conception of a color-blind constitution "has never 
been adopted by this Court as the proper meaning of the Equal 
Protection Clause. Indeed, we have expressly rejected this 
proposition on a number of occasions."40 
Finally, a fourth and divergent approach is found in Grutter 
v. Bollinger, wherein dissenting Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and 
Breyer argued that the constitution is color conscious rather 
than color-blind.41 Under this construction, race-based 
governmental action is impermissible only when it is invidious, 
not when it is designed to "prevent discrimination being 
perpetuated and to undo the effects of past discrimination."42 
Precisely what, if any, precedential value may be gleaned 
from the Harlan dissent in Plessy has been the subject of 
significant debate by the Supreme Court, as enumerated above, 
36. See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 343 n.42 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting). 
37. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 522 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
38. Id. at 522-23. 
39. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 513 (2005). 
40. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 355-56 (1978) (Brennan, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
41. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 298 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
42. ld. at 302 (quoting U.S. v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 876 
(5th Cir. 1966)). 
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and by legal scholars as well.43 The result is that it is unclear 
to what extent the Court has ever affirmed the notion of a 
color-blind constitution. Even if the Supreme Court has indeed 
adopted the concept, it is uncertain what that color-blind 
constitution idea means in practical application since the 
Justices themselves have strongly disagreed on the meaning. 
This judicial discord over the meaning of a color-blind 
constitution is strongly visible in the PIGS decision. In 
acknowledging that a color-blind requirement need not apply to 
citizens if such treatment is the result of court-ordered 
desegregation, Chief Justice Roberts evidenced his own 
acknowledgment that at least recent Supreme Court precedent 
rejected an unqualified articulation of a color-blind 
constitution. Chief Justice Roberts' tacit recognition of past 
interpretation suggests that, Chief Justice Roberts is arguing 
for new acceptance of a color-blind constitution concept. In this 
sense, he might simply have attempted to move the Court to a 
new post-race position.44 This position would be something 
akin to the Court's decision in Grutter, holding: "The Court 
expects that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences 
will no longer be necessary to further the interest [diversity in 
higher education] approved today."45 Regardless if the new 
course advocated in the Chief Justice's opinion is a mere 
precedential correction or a completely new paradigm, Chief 
Justice Roberts' opinion appears to substantially depart from 
Supreme Court jurisprudence.46 
Finally, it is important to note that the Chief Justice's 
opinion seems to be a rather activist one. Of particular 
significance is the willingness of Chief Justice Roberts and the 
conservative segment of the court to advocate for what seems to 
be little short of a rejection of stare decisis with regard to the 
Court's recent rulings on race. The liberal element of the Court 
43. E.g., Darlene C. Goring, Private Problem, Public Solution: Affirmative Action 
in the 21'1 Century, 33 AKRON L. REV. 209 (2000); Keith E. Sealing, The Myth of a Color 
Blind Constitution, 54 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 157 (1998). 
44. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Color Blind Court, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 791 (1996) 
(arguing that the origin of this position is Justices Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and Chief 
Justice Rehnquist). 
45. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 310. Note that the meaning of this "holding" is disputed. 
See Joel K. Goldstein, Justice O'Connor's Twenty-Five Year Expectation: The 
Legitimacy of Durational Limits in Grutter, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 83 (2006). 
46. Thomas P. Crocker, Envisioning the Constitution, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 38 
(2007). 
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advocates a deferential approach to local school districts that 
seems to have its roots in federalism. 47 
C. Justice Breyer 
Justice Breyer's dissent focused on a dramatically different 
issue than the Chief Justice's opinion. Justice Breyer argued 
that the issue before the Court was critical to educators and 
best resolved by educators rather than the Court.48 This 
position, calling for a high level of deference to governmental 
policymakers, includes a strong appeal to federalism.49 
Education is typically a state issue, and the Court should 
arguably leave states and local school districts to develop 
educational policy without judicial interference. 50 Indeed, 
Justice Breyer's willingness to grant deference to local school 
districts was so great that he even advocated a different level of 
scrutiny for race-based student assignment plans. This lower 
level of scrutiny would result in relatively little judicial 
evaluation of student assignment plans based on efforts of 
racially inclusivity. 51 To understand this reasoning, one must 
walk step-by-step through the entire Breyer opinion. 
Justice Breyer initially asserted that the Roberts plurality 
identified a distinction without a difference. 52 He agreed with 
the plurality that diversity has historically met the compelling 
governmental interest test when performed 'to remedy de jure 
segregation.53 According to Justice Breyer, however, the issue 
in PICS involved housing patterns that, absent reassignment 
of some students, resulted in neighborhood schools as racially 
47. For an argument positing that the decision evidences judicial restraint, see 
William E. Thro, The Constitutional, Educational, and Institutional Implications of the 
Majority and Concurring Opinions in Parents Involved in Community Schools, 231 
EDUC.L.REP.495(2008). 
48. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 848· 
49 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
49. "Federalism, as it has developed in the United States, is the system in which 
power to govern is shared between the national and state governments and where 
federal and state officials may respectively have powers that are at once co·extensive 
and overlapping." Philip T.K. Daniel & Patrick D. Pauken, The PICS Decision-
Academic Freedom v. Federalism: Consider the Constitutional Implications, 18 TEMP. 
POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 111, 133 (2008). 
50. See id. 
51. PICS, 551 U.S. at 833 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
52. Id. at 806. 
53. Id. at 843·44. 
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segregated as they would be under school segregation laws. 54 
Circumstances where schools become racially segregated 
despite no legal requirement of racial separation are known as 
de facto segregation. For Justice Breyer, regardless if the 
segregation at issue results from either de jure or de facto 
segregation, district plans like those used by the Seattle and 
Louisville school districts "represent local efforts to bring about 
the kind of racially integrated education that Brown u. Board 
of Education . .. long ago promised-efforts that this Court has 
repeatedly required, permitted, and encouraged local 
authorities to undertake."55 
According to the dissent, Brown u. Board of Education ruled 
that segregation was unconstitutional, and that school districts 
must integrate. Precisely how a school district complied with 
Brown in attempting to achieve integration was left "to the 
judgment of local communities."56 Because segregation itself 
was found unconstitutional, Justice Breyer argued that "the 
distinction between de jure segregation . . . and de facto 
segregation ... is meaningless in the present context."57 
Justice Breyer also objected to Chief Justice Roberts' 
opinion on grounds that the distinction between de jure and de 
facto segregation as determined by judicial finding is neither 
meaningful nor manageable.58 The extensive histories of both 
the Seattle and Louisville school districts provide some support 
for this position. As the plurality opinion pointed out, Louisville 
had once been subject to a desegregation order, while Seattle 
was never subject to such an order.59 Justice Breyer, however, 
observed that the Seattle school district may quite possibly 
have been subjected to such an order had it not entered into a 
private settlement agreement that included desegregation.60 In 
other words, both school districts were arguably segregated at 
one time, equally in violation of constitutional law; despite this, 
under Chief Justice Roberts' analysis, one district could 
permissibly use race-based admissions to integrate and the 
other district could not, the only distinction being whether the 
54. ld. at 806. 
55. Id. at 803 (Breyer, J. dissenting). 
56. ld. at 804. 
57. Id. at 806. 
58. ld. at 843-44. 
59. Id. at 720-21. 
60. Id. at 820-21 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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school district settled the case or took it to court. 61 For Justice 
Breyer, this was evidence that the distinction between de jure 
segregation and de facto segregation was-at least for the 
purposes of constitutional law-a false dichotomy. 62 
After dispensing with the de jure/de facto distinction, 
Justice Breyer reframed the question and asked, "Does the 
United States Constitution prohibit these school boards from 
using race-conscious criteria in the limited ways at issue 
here?"63 In answering this question, Justice Breyer identified 
several cases in which the Supreme Court had, as a general 
principle, granted broad discretion to school districts in the 
creation of educational policy. 64 Consistent with this discretion, 
the Court found that, "'[A]s a matter of educational policy[,] 
school authorities may well conclude that some kind of racial 
balance in the schools is desirable quite apart from any 
constitutional requirements."'65 
Justice Breyer argued that this position is consistent with 
historic equal protection jurisprudence holding that race-based 
policymaking is subject to different analyses dependent upon if 
the underlying policy seeks to include or to exclude members of 
the targeted race.66 The dissent appears to argue for two 
independent race-based approaches depending on what is at 
issue: traditional strict scrutiny for racial exclusion policies and 
something similar to the rational basis test for racial inclusion 
policies. 6 7 
In applying his hybrid rational basis test6x to the facts of 
PICS, Justice Breyer contended that "the school plans under 
review [did] not involve the kind of race-based harm that has 
led this Court, in other contexts, to find the use of race-
conscious criteria unconstitutional."69 A guidepost to aid in 
identifying whether the use of race considerations is inclusive 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 821. 
63. Id. at 823. 
64. Id. at 822. 
65. I d. at 824 (quoting N.C. Ed. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45 (1971)). 
66. Id. at 829. 
67. Id. at 832-33. 
68. The "rational basis test" is a judicial construction where a finding is made 
that government activity affects neither a fundamental right nor implicates a suspect 
class, hence, prescribing the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny as rationally related 
to a legitimate government interest. See, e.g., 16B Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 
813 (1998). 
69. PICS, 551 U.S. at 836 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
1] JUDICIAL CONFUSION 93 
and permissible, or conversely exclusive and harmful, Justice 
Breyer iterated factors proposed by Judge Alex Kozinski of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Judge 
Kozinski found that the use of race is not harmful if "'it carries 
no racial stigma and says nothing at all about that individual's 
aptitude or ability.'"70 This, Justice Breyer argued, is a 
constitutionally distinct difference-that is, whether the race-
based action is intended to result in racial inclusion or racial 
exclusion-requiring a different level of scrutiny depending on 
the nature of the action. 71 
Judge Kozinski took this same position in concurring with 
the majority when the PICS case appeared before the Ninth 
Circuit. 72 As he posited, the Fourteenth Amendment was 
designed to prevent the exclusion of racial minority groups. 73 
For this reason, governmental efforts formulated to include 
racial minority groups cannot run afoul of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 74 An inclusivity versus exclusivity distinction can 
explain seeming factual anomalies regarding race-conscious 
actions. The distinction illuminates, for example, why seeking 
to preemptively exclude members of racial minority groups 
from jury service is prohibited, while consideration of race in 
programs aimed at increased participation of racial minorities 
in higher education is permitted. 75 
Although not addressed in his dissent, Justice Breyer's 
distinction between policies of inclusion and policies of 
exclusion is itself problematic. The question remains how to 
determine if a policy is racially inclusive rather than exclusive. 
By way of example, if a citizen is a member of racial group A, 
then any policy designed to include more members of racial 
group B in a numerically limited activity, such as school 
enrollment, results in intentional action that automatically 
excludes members of racial group B. Despite this ambiguity, a 
clear standard for how a court should determine when a policy 
fosters racial inclusion rather than exclusion is, however, 
unaddressed by the dissent. Justice Breyer, having offered this 
70. !d. (quoting Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District 
No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1193-94 (2005)). 
71. !d. at 836-37. 
72. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 
1162, 1193 (2005), rev'd, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (Kozinski, J., concurring). 
73. !d. 
74. !d. at 1195. 
75. !d. at 1193. 
94 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2010 
position, ultimately concluded this analysis by applying the 
traditional strict scrutiny test in an attempt to demonstrate 
that even under the analysis of the Roberts plurality, the 
student assignment plans were permissible. 
Justice Breyer asserted three reasons that the student 
assignment plans articulated a compelling governmental 
interest.76 First, the consequences of de jure segregation 
continue long after the underlying laws are struck down. 77 The 
continued existence of these consequences ultimately justify 
remedy, not whether there is a court order in place formally 
acknowledging their existence.n 
Secondly, racial diversity has educational benefits for all 
students, and racial isolation is educationally harmful for all 
students.79 Taken together, avoiding racial isolation and 
ensuring diversity is an important educational goal long-
recognized by the Court-and as such, the Court should defer 
to the local school board's recognition of this goal as a 
compelling one.80 
Finally, since our society is pluralistic, there is value in and 
need for a public school system that prepares students for life 
in an integrated, pluralistic society. 81 Again, Justice Breyer 
argued that more than sufficient evidence exists to support 
such an idea, and consequently, the Court should defer to a 
local school district's determination that such goals serve a 
compelling governmental interest.82 
Taken individually or collectively, Justice Breyer argued 
that these three factors offer more than adequate justification 
for a finding that the Seattle and Louisville plans served a 
compelling governmental interest and therefore satisfied the 
first prong of the strict scrutiny test: 
The compelling interest at issue here, then, includes an effort 
to eradicate the remnants, not of general "societal 
discrimination" . . . but of primary and secondary school 
segregation . . . it includes an effort to create school 
environments that provide better educational opportunities 
76. PICS, 551 U.S. at 838-841 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
77. Id. at 838. 
78. Id. at 838-39. 
79. Id. at 839. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 840. 
82. Id. at 840-41. 
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for all children; it includes an effort to help create citizens 
better prepared to know, to understand, and to work with 
people of all races and backgrounds, thereby furthering the 
kind of democratic government our Constitution foresees. If 
an educational interest that combines these three elements is 
not "compelling," what is?83 
95 
Justice Breyer summarized his position by arguing that in 
addition to serving a compelling governmental interest, the 
district plans also met the narrow tailoring requirement in that 
(1) student choice resolves eighty percent of school 
assignments, (2) broad range limitations on the disparity 
permissible in a given school are more narrowly tailored than 
an affirmative quota or similar approach, and (3) in each 
student assignment plan developed to date, race has played a 
less central part. 84 For Justice Breyer, continuing to advocate 
for some level of deference to the local school board, the plans 
at issue in PICS were narrowly tailored to achieve the 
compelling governmental interests previously identified.85 
D. Justice Kennedy 
,Justice Kennedy opened his concurring opinion with what 
appears to be the theme of his position in the case: "In my view 
the state-mandated racial classifications at issue . . . are 
unconstitutional as the cases now come to us."86 The key 
phrase here is "as the cases now come to us." Justice Kennedy 
engaged both the Roberts and Breyer opinions, accepting some 
premises from each. The result is that his concurrence is both 
the controlling precedent of the case by casting the deciding 
vote,-while at the same time representative of only Justice 
Kennedy's view. Eight other justices advocated different 
positions. In this respect, the Kennedy opinion is somewhat 
enigmatic, and thus deserves robust discussion. 
Beginning his opinion with a simple premise, Justice 
Kennedy rejected Chief Justice Roberts' assertion that the 
school districts failed to advance a compelling governmental 
interest for the race conscious student assignment plans at 
issue.87 Justice Kennedy determined that, "[d]iversity, 
83. !d. at 843. 
84. !d. at 846·48. 
85. !d. at 855. 
86. !d. at 782 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
87. !d. at 783. 
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depending on its meaning and definition, is a compelling 
educational goal a school district may pursue."88 Despite his 
acceptance that diversity, even in K-12 education, may serve a 
compelling governmental interest, he concurred with Chief 
Justice Roberts in finding the student assignment plans 
unconstitutional.89 The explanation for this is relatively 
straightforward in that Justice Kennedy agreed with Chief 
Justice Roberts that the district plans must be subjected to 
strict judicial scrutiny; strict scrutiny required the plans to 
fulfill a compelling governmental interest while also narrowly 
tailored to achieve that interest.90 In applying this test, Justice 
Kennedy acknowledged, without holding, that the student 
assignment plans might have a compelling governmental 
interest but even in the presence of that interest, the 
government still "has the burden of proving that [the] racial 
classifications are 'narrowly tailored measures."'91 Here, 
Justice Kennedy found that the narrow tailoring requirement 
was not satisfied because the school districts' disputed use of 
racial classifications was made in "terms so broad and 
imprecise that they cannot withstand strict scrutiny."92 
One should recall, nevertheless, Justice Kennedy's 
introductory comment that the plans at issue were 
unconstitutional "as the cases now come to us." 93 The 
particular facts at issue that led to Justice Kennedy's opinion 
included the specific plan requirements and their execution. He 
further outlined the precise policies and practices he found 
objectionable. For example, he found an absence of narrow 
tailoring because it was unclear who made the formal decision 
to reject a student's request for assignment when it would 
adversely impact racial balance; the facts were also unclear 
whether this decision was subject to any administrative 
oversight. 94 Justice Kennedy also objected to the lack of 
explanation in the district plans for how similarly situated 




91. ld. (quoting Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005)). 
92. Id. at 785. 
93. !d. at 782. 
94. ld. at 785. 
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particular school.95 The concurrence pointed out that many of 
these objections might be satisfactorily addressed in practice.96 
Despite this fact, because strict scrutiny requires that a school 
district bear the burden of proving narrow tailoring, 
compliance with this requirement demands carefully 
articulated policies. 97 In other words, the court "cannot 
construe ambiguities in favor of the state."98 
Another of Justice Kennedy's objections focused on the 
actual racial categories utilized in the plans.99 In the Seattle 
plan, students were divided into two racial categories: white 
and non-white. 100 Justice Kennedy found that these two "crude 
racial categories" did not evidence a carefully constructed, 
narrowly tailored means by which to achieve the compelling 
interest of educational diversity. 101 
The remainder of the concurrence addresses concerns 
raised by both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Breyer. What 
results is a much clearer understanding of his views. First, he 
rejected what he referred to as the Chief Justice's "all-too-
unyielding insistence that race cannot be a factor" in instances 
Justice Kennedy would himself probably allow. 102 While Chief 
Justice Roberts' admonition-that to end racial inequality, the 
government must cease treating individuals unequally based 
on race-might appeal to the other conservative members of 
the Court, Justice Kennedy believed such a position contradicts 
more than fifty years of experience that suggests "the problem 
before us defies so easy a solution." 103 Justice Kennedy agreed 
with Chief Justice Roberts that the PICS case included the 
promulgation of a compelling governmental interest unique 
from those previously recognized by the Court-including 
Grutter. -The concurrence nonetheless departed from the 
Chief Justice in that Justice Kennedy suggested that past 
recognition of compelling interests such as diversity in student 
enrollment in higher education "help inform the present 
95. I d. 
96. Id. at 786. 
97. I d. 
98. I d. 
99. I d. 
100. I d. 
101. I d. 
102. Id. at 787. 
103. Id. at 788. 
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inquiry," and suggested that similar compelling interests might 
be identifiable under different factual circumstances. 104 
Similarly, while Justice Kennedy's aligned some of his 
views with Justice Breyer's dissent, he heavily criticized 
Justice Breyer for eschewing the strict scrutiny test in favor of 
a "permissive strict scrutiny test (which bears more than a 
passing resemblance to rational-basis review)." 105 The 
imposition of such a different standard of review for 
governmental inclusive race-based actions than for exclusive 
race-based actions would impose "no principled limit and would 
result in the broad acceptance of governmental racial 
classifications in areas far afield from schooling." 106 
Justice Kennedy concluded by stating: 
The decision today should not prevent school districts from 
continuing the important work of bringing together students 
of different racial, ethnic, and economic backgrounds. Due to 
a variety of factors-some influenced by government, some 
not-neighborhoods in our communities do not reflect the 
diversity of our Nation as a whole. Those entrusted with 
directing our public schools can bring to bear the creativity of 
experts, parents, administrators, and other concerned citizens 
to find a way to achieve the compelling interests they face 
without resorting to widespread governmental allocation of 
benefits and burdens on the basis of racial classifications. 107 
The foregoing makes it seem that Justice Kennedy was reticent 
to accept the remedy of de facto segregation as a compelling 
governmental interest. He did, however, refuse to accept the 
Chief Justice's position that in most circumstances remedying 
de facto segregation in public schools cannot be a compelling 
governmental interest. 108 
Justice Kennedy's concurrence leaves unanswered two very 
serious questions that have since generated judicial confusion. 
The first question is whether Justice Kennedy implicitly 
recognized a compelling governmental interest that permits 
schools to use race-based policies to remedy de facto 
segregation. Although he rejected Chief Justice Roberts' 
negative answer to this question, he himself did not render a 
104. Id. at 791. 
105. I d. 
106. I d. 
107. Id. at 798. 
108. See id. 
1] JUDICIAL CONFUSION 99 
positive response to the issue. For this reason, all educators are 
well advised to proceed cautiously before pursuing race-based 
policies. As discussed below, PICS is the second opportunity 
presented to Justice Kennedy to explicitly recognize a 
compelling governmental interest in race-based actions taken 
by public educators. On each occasion he declined to 
acknowledge such an interest outright, instead only 
acknowledging an abstract potential a compelling 
governmental interest. Educators and attorneys alike are left 
to wonder why Justice Kennedy avoided identifying what 
qualifies as a compelling governmental interest in this context. 
The second question asks, assuming there is a compelling 
governmental interest, how can a school district fashion a 
policy or program to meet the narrow tailoring requirement? 
Critical to such an inquiry is the issue of how Justice Kennedy 
viewed the compelling interest in the education context. The 
compelling interest could be expressed as pursuit of 
educational diversity, or conversely as avoiding racial isolation 
in education. Candor requires concession this may be a false 
dichotomy. The simple fact of the matter is, however, that 
Justice Kennedy's opinion does little to clarify what the 
compelling governmental interest would be, assuming there 
even IS one. 
On the one hand, one can conceive that educational 
diversity might qualify as a compelling governmental interest, 
thereby permitting a school district to affirmatively pursue 
actions designed to maintain diversity at or further diversify a 
local school. Conversely, one can conceive a more narrow 
compelling governmental interest that permitted a local school 
district to act only to prevent racial isolation in education. 
Under the latter formulation, a district might engage in race-
based action only when the district had already become de facto 
segregated. The broader approach, in contrast, would allow 
school districts to act affirmatively to avoid finding themselves 
in such a situation in the first place. Whether Justice Kennedy 
would find either of these or some alternative paradigm a 
compelling governmental interest is unclear the absence of 
bright-line judicial guidance leaves school districts with little 
direction as how to narrowly tailor their actions. 
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Succinctly put, Justice Kennedy's opinion creates an opaque 
tapestry, and consequently, those courts that have 
subsequently interpreted the decision in PICS have reached 
some remarkably different conclusions as to its meaning and 
application. 
Ill. JUDICIAL CONFUSION 
Relatively little authoritative judicial interpretation is 
available to give contour to the PICS case. No federal appellate 
court has analyzed the PICS decision. The federal district 
courts that have discussed the case have typically done so 
where the examination of the case was either not outcome 
determinative or the PICS decision was simply deemed 
inapplicable. Notwithstanding these limitations, the courts 
that have studied the case generally agree that Justice 
Kennedy's concurrence is the authoritative position. When it 
comes to applying that opinion to the facts before them, lower 
court judges have interpreted the case with fairly significant 
variation. 
In short, the existing judicial commentary seems to agree 
that Justice Kennedy's opinion controls and that educational 
diversity, or the avoidance of racial isolation in education, 
might be a compelling governmental interest. Under what 
circumstances and how a plan can be narrowly tailored to meet 
that interest is, at best, crepuscular. The following analysis of 
four subsequent opinions demonstrates the broad spectrum of 
interpretation of the PICS case by lower courts. Without clear 
standards by which to evaluate future cases, the resultant 
opinions are divergent in nature and show the general 
confusion of lower courts. 
A. Fisher: Remedying past injustice manifested as de facto 
segregation is impermissible 
The first of these cases is Fisher u. Tucson Unified School 
District. 109 In Fisher, the defendant school district sought a 
certificate of closure terminating court oversight of district 
desegregation efforts. 110 While the court ordered that the 
school district submit a full report documenting compliance 
109. Fisher v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61679, at 1 (2007). 
llO. ld. at 3. 
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with the desegregation settlement, it also reviewed the 
district's student assignment policy in light of the recent PICS 
decision. 111 The court in Fisher found that the student 
assignment policy, like those at issue in PICS, "'[did] not 
provide for a meaningful individualized review of applicants' 
but instead relie[d] on the race of the student in a non-
individualized, mechanical way." 112 According to the lower 
court, PICS: made it quite clear that race-based student 
assignments required pursuant to a desegregation decree 
become constitutionally prohibited once the vestiges of prior 
intentional segregation are eliminated." 113 The policy at issue 
in Fisher prohibited student transfer where the transfer would 
"'further imbalance the ethnic makeup of the home school."' 114 
As in PICS, the student assignment plan at issue could result 
in an individual's race determining the outcome. Rather than 
simply holding that this was unconstitutional under PICS, the 
court broadly held that such a policy is itself "unconstitutional 
segregation unless [it is] aimed at remedying de jure 
segregation." 115 
Though not explicit, the court apparently read Justice 
Kennedy's concurrence primarily in light of Chief Justice 
Roberts' opinion. Justice Kennedy signed onto the Chief 
Justice's opinion in several sections, including where Chief 
Justice Roberts said: 
Our cases recognized a fundamental difference between those 
districts that had engaged in de jure segregation and those 
whose segregation was the result of other factors. School 
districts that had engaged in de jure segregation had an 
affirmative constitutional duty to desegregate; those that 
were de facto segregated did not. 116 
Importantly, as noted, Justice Kennedy implicitly rejected the 
Roberts position that remedying de facto segregation could 
never be a compelling state interest: 
The cases here were argued upon the assumption, and come 
to us on the premise, that the discrimination in question did 
111. !d. at 33. 
112. !d. at 34 (quoting PICS, 551 U.S. at 723). 
113. !d. at 35. 
114. ld. at 34. (quoting Tucson Unified School District's Policy). 
115. !d. at 40. 
116. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Dist. No. 1 551 U.S. 701 (2007) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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not result from de jure actions. And when de facto 
discrimination is at issue our tradition has been that the 
remedial rules are different. The State must seek alternatives 
to the classification and differential treatment of individuals 
by race, at least absent some extraordinary showing not 
present here. 117 
The question emerges as to how authoritative is Justice 
Kennedy's admonition to avoid classifications of different races 
unless under extraordinary circumstances not shown in the 
PICS facts. This question is easily identifiable but difficult to 
answer. Chief Justice Roberts and three other justices found 
that only the remedy of de jure segregation is a permissible 
governmental interest-at least in terms of remedying the 
consequences of past discrimination by law. Justice Kennedy 
clearly states his own position as general agreement, but with 
the caveat of the final line: "at least absent some extraordinary 
showing." This language leaves open some exceptional 
circumstance in which remedying de facto segregation might be 
found a compelling governmental interest the issue remains as 
to the precedential value of this phrase. Without Justice 
Kennedy's fifth vote, the plurality opinion is not the majority 
opinion, therefore leaving possible applications for Kennedy's 
narrow caveat. The language is perhaps mere dicta. 
Regrettably, the court in Fisher did not specifically address 
Justice Kennedy's qualifying phrase, and seems to have held 
only, as in PICS, that de jure segregation may be addressed 
through remedies inappropriate for de facto segregation. 
While the Fisher court's declining to comment on Justice 
Kennedy's cautionary language is troublesome, there is an 
additional and far more problematic issue in Fisher since 
Justice Kennedy leaves an open door for an education exception 
in some future case. In PICS, Justice Kennedy did, with the 
exception of his "extraordinary showing" caution, seem to agree 
with the Chief Justice that remedying de facto segregation 
cannot be justified on the basis of addressing the consequences 
of past de jure segregation. In the concurrence, however, 
Justice Kennedy indicated that educational diversity, or at 
least avoiding racial isolation in education, might be a 
compelling interest. 118 The court in Fisher completely ignored 
117. Id. at 796. 
118. ld. at 797-98. 
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this portion of Justice Kennedy's opinion, that while other 
courts have identified this as a key part of the opinion. 
One of two scenarios best explains the analytical 
shortcomings of the Fisher decision. One option is that the 
decision is the result of insufficient context. Fisher seems to 
correctly apply the portion of the Chief Justice's opinion with 
Justice Kennedy in concurrence, that found remedying de facto 
segregation is not justified by a need to address the 
consequences of past de jure segregation. The court in Fisher, 
nonetheless, overlooked two important limitations that Justice 
Kennedy imposed on his concurrence: first, the Fisher court 
included no discussion of what might constitute an 
"extraordinary showing," and secondly, was completely silent 
on the two points Justice Kennedy's suggested might qualify as 
a compelling governmental interest-namely, educational 
diversity or at least avoiding racial isolation in education. 119 
One possible explanation of this lack of context may be that 
the student assignment plan in Fisher was subordinate to the 
primary issue of whether the district had achieved unitary 
status. 120 Under these circumstances, the PICS discussion may 
have been raised by the court rather than the parties, and thus 
the lack of discussion of Justice Kennedy's limitations on the 
Chief Justice's opinion in Fisher may be explained by an 
absence of dialogue on the issue by the parties in motions, 
briefs, or hearings. 
The second possible scenario is that this decision was 
simply a means to an end and that rather than overlooking 
Justice Kennedy's limitations, the court deliberately 
disregarded them. The Fisher court's silence at to these 
limitations makes it uncertain if the court disregarded them 
nefariously or merely inadvertently, or if the court simply 
chose not to analyze these issues in the written ruling. 
Regardless of the foregoing analysis, Fisher is the post-
PIGS decision that most resembles Chief Justice Roberts' 
opinion. However, because it does not align well with the 
Kennedy concurrence or other post-PJCS cases, it remains to be 
seen to what extent the Fisher decision will be deemed 
authoritative. 
119. !d. at 796-98. 
120. See generally id. at 715 (describing a school district found to have reached 
unitary status by removing its previous policy of segregation to the extent it was 
practicable). 
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B. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action: Remedying de facto 
segregation is permissible if for the purpose of educational 
diversity or at least preventing racial isolation in education 
Other courts have looked to the PICS case and reached a 
very different conclusion than that arrived at in Fisher. The 
court in Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the 
University of Michigan, found that remedying de facto 
segregation is permissible if for the purpose of education 
diversity or at least preventing racial isolation in education. 121 
Numerous plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that a state 
constitutional amendment prohibiting the state's use of 
affirmative action violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution. 122 The defendant, University of 
Michigan, moved to dismiss. 123 
In partially granting and partially denying the motion to 
dismiss, the court, albeit superficially, discussed PICS as the 
Supreme Court's reaffirmation that "states have a 'compelling 
interest [in] remedying the effects of past intentional 
discrimination' with race-conscious programs"-de jure 
segregation-and that "[i]t also appears that a majority of the 
justices agree that schools may employ race-based programs to 
address 'the problem of de facto resegregation in schooling."' 124 
The court found this precedent m Justice Kennedy's 
concurrence wherein he stated: 
The plurality opinion is at least open to the interpretation 
that the Constitution requires school districts to ignore the 
problem of de facto resegregation in schooling. I cannot 
endorse that conclusion. To the extent the plurality opinion 
suggests the Constitution mandates that state and local 
school authorities must accept the status quo of racial 
isolation in schools, it is, in my view, profoundly mistaken. 125 
Although the court in Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action 
spent minimal time discussing PICS, it did recognize Justice 
Kennedy's mixed message on the subject, noting that while 
action to cure de facto segregation is apparently permissible, it 
121. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich .• 539 F. 
Supp. 2d 924, 957 (E.D. Mich. 2008) [hereinafter Coalition]. 
122. ld. at 924. 
123. Id. at 944. 
124. ld. at 957. 
125. PICS, 551 U.S. at 788 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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is "fundamentally different" from the "obligation to cure past 
discrimination" that is the remedy for de jure segregation. 126 
Unfortunately, the court did not address the deceptively simple 
question of what this "fundamental" difference may be. 
Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action is an important case 
because it held-quite differently from the court in Fisher-
that the limitations to the Chief Justice's opinion put forth by 
Justice Kennedy in his concurrence are in fact the 
authoritative decision in PICS. As a result of this, that court 
agreed with Justice Kennedy's implicit rejection of the position 
that only de jure segregation may be the basis for race-
conscious remedial action. However, the lower court's limited 
treatment of the case also reflects the fact that Justice 
Kennedy has not affirmatively stated that race-conscious 
remedial action is permissible to address de facto segregation. 
The resulting decision in Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action 
seems to more accurately represent Justice Kennedy's position 
than the analysis Fisher, but still fails to provide meaningful 
interpretation and guidance for educators. 
C. Meredith: De facto segregation may be addressed for the 
purpose of educational diversity or at least preventing racial 
isolation in education and, for guidance as to permissible 
means, one should look to the actions specifically listed in 
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in PICS 
The views expressed in Fisher and Coalition to Defend 
Affirmative Action evidence continued confusion on the parts of 
lower courts on how best to interpret Justice Kennedy's 
concurrence. An alternative approach to the previously 
discussed cases involves applying Justice Kennedy's opinion as 
literally as possible. The Louisville school district in PICS 
implicitly took this approach in subsequent litigation. 
In Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education, a case 
following PICS, the plaintiff requested that the court mandate 
a certain student's enrollment in a specific school within the 
district. 127 The court considered the plaintiff's request moot 
since the student was enrolled in the desired school prior to the 
126. Coalition, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 957. 
127. Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64473, at 2 
(W.D. Ky. 2007). 
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hearing. 128 However, the court discovered during this dispute 
that the defendant school district utilized different attendance 
zones for black and white students. 129 This practice was not 
previously known to nor considered by either the district court 
or the United States Supreme Court. The district court ruled 
that the race-based attendance zone practice was 
impermissible, as "such an approach appears to be the 
functional equivalent of a race-based binary selection process, 
which a solid majority of the current Supreme Court has 
rejected in these circumstances." 130 The court, nonetheless, 
cited Justice Kennedy's concurrence as precedent, language 
stating that "[s]chool boards 'are free to devise race-conscious 
measures to address the problem in a general way and without 
treating each student in a different fashion solely on the basis 
of a systematic, individual typing by race."' 131 
In order to explain the meaning of this finding, the court 
looked to the opinion itself, implying that permissible action on 
the part of the school district must conform to the list of actions 
specifically enumerated by Justice Kennedy in his concurrence: 
School boards may pursue the goal of bringing together 
students of diverse backgrounds and races through other 
means, including strategic site selection of new schools; 
drawing attendance zones with general recognition of the 
demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for 
special programs; recruiting students and faculty in a 
targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and 
other statistics by race. These mechanisms are race conscious 
but do not lead to different treatment based on a classification 
that tells each student he or she is to be defined by race, so it 
is unlikely that any of them would demand strict scrutiny to 
be found permissible. 132 
While treating Justice Kennedy's list as exhaustive is 
convenient and appears judicially manageable, this approach 
does not seem entirely consistent with Justice Kennedy's 
intentions. Justice Kennedy made it clear that the list provided 
was not meant to be exhaustive: 
128. Id. at 9. 
129. ld. at 2. 
130. Id. at 4. 
131. /d. at 5 (quoting Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle Sch. Dist. 
No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 788-89 (2007)). 
132. PICS, 551 U.S. at 789 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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If school authorities are concerned that the student-body 
compositions of certain schools interfere with the objective of 
offering an equal educational opportunity to all of their 
students, they are free to devise race-conscious measures to 
address the problem in a general way and without treating 
each student in a different fashion solely on the basis of a 
systematic, individual typing by race. 133 
107 
The court in Meredith concluded that regardless what may 
or may not be permissible, Chief Justice Roberts and three 
other judges firmly shunned decision-making that can result in 
race becoming the sole determining factor, and observed that 
"Justice Kennedy, while not so unequivocal, was nevertheless 
equally clear" that this kind of racial classification was 
impermissible. 134 
Of particular concern with this approach is whether the 
benefit a judicially manageable test outweighs the detriment 
caused by an inflexible set of permissible options. This is best 
considered by the issue in this case. The Louisville school 
district utilized race-based attendance zones. The court found 
that this was impermissible because this practice was not one 
enumerated by Justice Kennedy, and further, it was a practice 
most analogous to the race-based student assignment plan 
struck down by the Court in PICS. 
Two potential problems arise from this analysis. First and 
most obvious, Justice Kennedy expressed in his opinion that 
his words were not intended to be treated legalistically. 135 
While it is understandable that a cautious court would do so 
anyway, the result is something of a judicial shortcut that 
ultimately provides little guidance for educators. 
The second problem with the analysis in Meredith is that 
there is no explanation of how the impermissible race-based 
attendance zones were distinguishable from the permissible 
attendance zones drawn "with general recognition of the 
demographics of neighborhoods" mentioned in Justice 
Kennedy's concurrence. 136 While it is certainly possible to 
consider these distinguishable practices, without an 
examination of how they are distinguishable, the holding in 
Meredith also lacks meaningful guidance, despite its adherence 
133. /d. at 788-89. 
134. Meredith, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6447:3, at 4. 
135. PICS, 551 U.S. at 797-798 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
136. /d. at 789. 
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to Justice Kennedy's list of acceptable practices. In short, even 
if educators apply PICS legalistically and engage only in the 
practices specifically identified in the Kennedy concurrence as 
permissible, significant ambiguity may still plague their action. 
Educators are left to determine whether a specific district 
policy (such as race-based attendance zones) falls within the 
scope of one or more of the identified permissible practices). 
Reliance on Justice Kennedy's non-exclusive list of permissible 
practices in the PICS decision, may prove only to be the 
illusion of compliance. 
Finally, perhaps the most interesting interpretation of the 
PICS case is found in Hart u. Community School Board of 
Brooklyn. 137 The court in Hart moved far from the Chief 
Justice's opinion, finding that PICS actually holds that Grutter 
applies to K-12 education as well as higher education. 138 Hart 
appears to be the other bookend to Fisher in that each seems, 
to some extent, to seek the means for an already determined 
end. 
In Hart, the defendant school district moved to terminate a 
desegregation order and requested a certificate of closure. 139 
The prospective interveners argued that although a formal 
certificate of closure had not previously been requested or 
granted, the court in 1990 had found the district had remedied 
the underlying de jure segregation constitutional violations. 140 
Because of this finding, the school district's continued use of 
race in student assignments violated the Equal Protection 
Clause. 141 The court granted the motion to terminate the 
desegregation order and issued a certificate of closure. 142 
The court then stated that in PICS "Justice Kennedy 
acknowledged the need in some instances to take race into 
account in school assignments." 143 With no further explanation 
of how Justice Kennedy's concurrence supported the 
proposition, the court cited Brown u. Board of Education for the 
precedent that segregation "has a detrimental effect" on 
137. Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Brooklyn, 536 F. Supp. 2d 274 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
138. Id. at 283. 
139. ld. at 275. 
140. Id. at 276. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 284. 
143. Id. at 282. 
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education. 144 The court further announced that "[t]he same 
considerations that permit race as one factor among many that 
may be considered in college and graduate schools under 
Grutter and Bakke should be applied to grade schools where 
characteristics for future success or failure are imprinted on 
students." 145 
The application of the Grutter standard to grades K-12, 
though poorly substantiated in Hart, is not without 
justification. Admittedly, one problem with this argument is 
that Justice Kennedy dissented in Grutter-indicating that he 
would be unlikely to find Grutter applicable elsewhere. 
Significantly, a review of Justice Kennedy's dissent in that case 
reflects a position quite similar to his position in PICS: 
To be constitutional, a university's compelling interest in a 
diverse student body must be achieved by a system where 
individual assessment is safeguarded through the entire 
process. There is no constitutional objection to the goal of 
considering race as one modest factor among many others to 
achieve diversity, but an educational institution must ensure, 
through sufficient procedures, that each applicant receives 
individual consideration and that race does not become a 
predominant factor in the admissions decision making. 146 
The inference when comparing these two cases is that Justice 
Kennedy acknowledges that there might be a compelling 
governmental interest in educational diversity or at least 
avoiding racial isolation in both K-12 and higher education, but 
that the processes at issue in both Grutter and PICS were not 
sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve these interests. 
Unfortunately, this inference is not so intuitive in context of 
the actual opinions. First, Justice Kennedy agreed to the 
plurality opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts with regard 
to Parts I, II, III-A, and III-C of PICS. In the conclusion of Part 
III-A, Chief Justice Roberts specifically identifies the Grutter 
decision, noting: 
The Court in Grutter expressly articulated key limitations on 
its holding-defining- a specific type of broad-based 
diversity and noting the unique context of higher education-
but these limitations were largely disregarded by the lower 
courts in extending Grutter to uphold race-based assignments 
144. !d. at 283. 
145. !d. 
146. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 392-93 (2003). 
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in elementary and secondary schools. The present cases are 
not governed by Grutter. 147 
While this would seem to suggest that Justice Kennedy 
similarly rejects the applicability of Grutter, he elsewhere 
somewhat favorably discusses that case. In his concurrence, he 
found the dissent's reliance on Grutter "understandable." 148 
Justice Kennedy, however, found it "simply baffling" to think 
that either of the student assignment plans would hold up 
under Grutter. 149 
According to Justice Kennedy, in Grutter "the Court 
sustained a system that, it found, was flexible enough to take 
into account 'all pertinent elements of diversity."' 150 In PICS, 
nevertheless, the school plans at issue were inflexible and 
overly-broad: 
If those students [subject to the assignment plans at issue] 
were considered for a whole range of their talents and school 
needs with race as just one consideration, Grutter would have 
some application. That, though, is not the case. 151 
Again, one is left with the distinct impression that Justice 
Kennedy had no quarrel with educational diversity, or at least 
avoiding racial isolation in K-12 education, as a compelling 
governmental interest. Justice Kennedy rather appears to 
argue that even if they were compelling governmental 
interests-and he seems almost coy in his refusal to say that 
they qualify-the Seattle and Louisville student assignment 
plans would still fail for lack of narrow tailoring, the same 
objection that he raised in Grutter. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Although there has been no authoritative interpretation of 
PICS since the Supreme Court reached its decision, the 
consensus view of the lower courts is that Justice Kennedy's 
concurrence is the authoritative opinion of the court. 152 The few 
147. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 
701, 725 (2007). 
148. Id. at 792 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
149. ld. at 793 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341). 
150. ld. 
151. Id. 
152. Note that this is not a definitively resolved issue. For a recent article 
portraying the Roberts opinion as the more definitive portion of the decision see 
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extant federal trial court decisions are, by and large, in 
agreement that Justice Kennedy has implicitly accepted 
educational diversity and avoiding racial isolation in education 
as compelling governmental interests. 
While there remains a great deal of uncertainty is how a 
school district can narrowly tailor a student assignment plan in 
order to achieve such an interest without running afoul of the 
Equal Protection Clause. At the very least, it seems that those 
actions listed specifically in Justice Kennedy's concurring 
opinion are constitutionally permissible, though as is seen in 
Meredith, the most recent decision, it is not always clear how 
those listed actions will be defined. It is also apparent that any 
race-based student assignment policy that results in one 
individual's race as the determinative factor in school 
enrollment is likely impermissible. There remains, however, a 
world of uncertainty between these two points, as evidenced by 
the significant nuances offered by the lower courts. 
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